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Prof. Joseph Chinyong Liow S. Rajaratnam School of Int’l Studies, Nanyang Technological University
Message, Medium and Mobilisation 
in Malaysia: Paradigm Shift or 
Business as Usual?
Elections in Malaysia were described by Harold Crouch in his contribution to The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia (1996) as “no more than a ritual providing a cloak of legitimacy for what is really 
authoritarian rule”, where they “allow critics to let off a little steam while giving the government a 
useful means of gauging the level of public dissatisfaction.” By that yardstick, the results of Malaysia’s 
twelfth general elections on March 8, 2008 were nothing short of remarkable. Islamists, secular 
democrats, and Malay reformists – all from the opposition - somehow managed to surmount their 
differences and cobble together a formal alliance which managed to deal a major blow to the ruling 
National Front coalition. Led by the indefatigable Anwar Ibrahim, the former deputy prime minister 
who was unceremoniously sacked and jailed for alleged corruption and sexual misconduct in 1998, this 
opposition coalition, which would later take on the name of the Peoples’ Alliance (Pakatan Rakyat), 
managed to deny the National Front a two-thirds parliamentary majority, no mean feat by Malaysian 
standards. Not only that, the opposition also managed to inflict upon the incumbent regime a string 
of defeats in a concurrent series of state-level local elections which resulted in five state legislatures 
falling into their hands. This was a feat never before achieved by the political opposition in Malaysia. 
The election results of 2008 were all the more poignant given how the National Front had won a 
landslide victory when the country last went to the polls a mere four years earlier, in 2004. 
The March 8 election results clearly showed up the weaknesses 
of the Abdullah Badawi administration. Over and above that, 
the elections were significant for two further reasons. First, there 
was a marked departure from the communal narrative that 
had long dominated political discourse in Malaysia. Although 
the opposition coalition consisted of Islamists and non-Muslim 
activists, it managed to jettison tried-and-tested practices of 
falling back on ethnic and religious affinities, and instead based 
its appeal to a cross-section of the public on shared aspirations 
for justice, welfare, and anti-corruption. Second, more so than 
in any previous election, the new media was effectively used as 
alternative vehicles for the transmission and dissemination of 
information detrimental to the cause of the incumbent. New 
patterns of mobilisation in Malaysian politics then, rested on these 
twin pillars of message (post-communalism) and medium (new 
media). Evidently, both combined to such remarkable effect that 
observers quickly pronounced the advent of a “new politics” that 
successfully surmounted what seemed insurmountable in Malaysia 
– primordial identification and race-based politics. 
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Much of the hope underpinning predictions of a new era of politics in Malaysia stems 
from the notable changes in the means of political mobilisation. That is, the opposition 
appears to have found new ways to reach the populace on a large scale, bypassing the 
conventional instruments of information dissemination in the process (which in any case 
work to favour the incumbent over the opposition). The 2008 election was very much an 
‘internet election’, where the opposition’s political campaign was run, with the help of an 
activist civil sphere, primarily online, and to devastating effect. Indeed, so significant was 
the role of new media that even incumbent leaders have conceded that their inability or 
reluctance to factor the role of the new media into their overall strategy was arguably 
their biggest tactical mistake. 
More important than the means of mobilisation, however, is the message. In this regard, 
it bears noting that the hope for a new dawn in Malaysia’s political narratives does not 
appear to have been borne out in the events that have followed since. To be sure, what 
was initially striking about the 2008 reversal of fortunes for the contestants was the fact 
that it resulted from an erosion of the dominant narrative. This time, it was the Peoples’ 
Alliance that played on the fears of the non-Malays regarding minority rights, drawing 
attention to the Abdullah government’s inability to protect the respective communities 
from the gradual erosion of freedom of worship in a number of controversial, high profile 
cases of religious conversions and “body-snatching”1.  At the same time, the opposition 
also focused on numerous scandals and abuse of power that had been uncovered by the 
instruments of new media, not only to lay siege on the incumbent, but also to underpin 
a consensus shared across the ethno-political spectrum for new models of governance 
based on judicial reform, democratic pluralism, anti-corruption, and social justice.
However, as the euphoria of victory gave way to the reality of incumbency it soon became 
clear that one of the immediate and pressing challenges confronting the opposition 
coalition was the need to cement the opposition alliance, or at least to minimise ruptures 
to it arising from differences in ideologies, interests, and goals. To that effect, initial 
analyses of voting patterns were encouraging. The PAS and DAP electoral machineries 
cooperated extensively during the campaigning. As a result, PAS triumphed not only in its 
core rural Malay-Muslim constituencies, but also in several others with high concentrations 
of non-Malays. Likewise, the DAP won in many mixed constituencies, whether ethnic 
Malay support often tilted the balance to their favour in close contests. Outperforming 
both parties though, was the resurgent PKR, which was winning solid support from both 
ethnic minorities as well as urban Malay voters.
Beyond the immediate exigencies of campaign politics, the real litmus test of Malaysia’s 
resolve to transcend race and ethnicity, in particular the promulgation of the ideology 
of Malay primacy, is the continued relevance of affirmative action policies launched 
under the New Economic Policy (NEP), a national economic program implemented in 
1970 with the aim of leveling the economic playing field between the Malays and other 
ethnic groups (notably, the Chinese). To that end, it is noteworthy that on the campaign 
1 “Body-snatching” is the colloquial term used in Malaysia to describe incidents where state Islamic religious authorities intervene 
in non-Muslim funerals to confiscate the body of the deceased on the grounds that the deceased was in fact a Muslim and hence 
had to be buried under Muslim rites. This has become a particularly controversial practice in Malaysia because state Islamic religious 
authorities often do not, or are unable to, produce verifiable evidence that the deceased had actually converted to Islam before 
his or her death.
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trail Anwar Ibrahim declared categorically that the 
opposition would dispense with the NEP and race-
based affirmative action policies if it came to power. 
Campaign rhetoric aside, the practical dismantling this 
thirty-eight year old policy of affirmative action proved 
much more difficult. Soon after DAP gained control 
of the state of Penang, the chief minister announced 
that he would do away with the NEP and adopt a 
tender-based system for contracts. This provoked 
harsh reactions from Malay politicians, including 
leaders of PAS. Recognising of the brewing rift, Anwar 
attempted to calm the situation by suggesting that 
while the affirmative action policies under the NEP 
were problematic, they needed to be reformed rather 
than abolished outright. Evident from Anwar’s shift 
in position is the explicit unwillingness on the part of 
Malay leaders – even among those from the Peoples’ 
Alliance – to move away wholesale from affirmative 
action policies.
Debates over affirmative action within the Peoples’ 
Alliance speak to deeper concerns regarding the 
viability and sustainability of this coalition and its 
attempt to transcend the dominant narratives of 
race and ethnicity. It bears recalling the fate of the 
Alternative Front formed to contest the 1999 general 
election, which collapsed because it was eventually 
unable to reconcile the interests of the DAP and PAS, 
the latter of which was resolute in its pursuit of the 
Islamic state objective. Given the memory of that 
recent failure, the success of the Peoples’ Alliance as a 
real alternative to the National Front will undoubtedly 
hinge on continued collegiality and cooperation 
between component parties. To that end, there are 
reasons to be skeptical of the resilience of the DAP-
PAS leg of the alliance. Ideologically, the parties are 
poles apart, even though they have endeavoured to 
cement their relations within the rubric of the Peoples’ 
Alliance by registering the coalition as an official 
institution. Given the mass of ideological tensions 
which are currently barely papered over, it should 
not be a surprise that since the elections problems 
have surfaced on several occasions between DAP 
and PAS, above all over the Islamic state objective of 
PAS that has historically impeded cooperation and 
set the two parties against each other. 
Doubts over the longer-term viability of the alliance 
have been compounded by rumors of a potential 
coalition between UMNO and PAS. Soon after 
the March 8 election, it became evident that part 
of UMNO’s strategy to regain lost ground was to 
reach out to PAS on the premise of “Malay-Muslim 
unity.” Almost immediately after the election results 
were announced, the upper echelon of the UMNO 
leadership extended an olive branch to PAS on the 
grounds that the fractures in the Malay-Muslim 
community caused by UMNO-PAS rivalry needed to 
be healed given that non-Muslim minorities were 
becoming increasingly assertive of their rights and 
questioning the principle of Malay primacy. 
The fact that a certain segment of the PAS leadership 
responded to UMNO overtures caused much disquiet 
not only among the party rank and file, which was 
unsure of what to make of the mixed signals being 
sent, but also for the other component parties 
of the Peoples’ Alliance as well, whose leaders 
expressed frustration and disappointment that they 
were neither informed nor consulted on a matter 
which had such potentially explosive consequences. 
Even more shocking was the fact that the first 
meeting took place barely a few days after the 
elections and explored the possibility of localised 
UMNO-PAS coalitions in Selangor, which was won 
by the opposition. 
The issue of cooperation with UMNO was raised and 
intensely debated at the PAS general assemblies of 
August 2008 and June 2009. While some senior 
stalwarts defended the party leadership’s decision to 
accept UMNO invitations for dialogue, most of the 
rank and file disapproved the move. By virtue of being 
the most senior leader involved in some of the talks, 
PAS deputy president Nasharuddin Mat Isa bore the 
brunt of the criticisms. In response to the sentiments 
from the ground, the leadership of PAS declared its 
continued commitment to the Peoples’ Alliance at 
the end of the meeting. Yet despite this attempt to 
close ranks and bring the issue to a close, elements 
within PAS continue to entertain the possibility of 
future cooperation with UMNO for several reasons. 
First, some within PAS leadership circles continue to 
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harbour reservations towards Anwar, and are hesitant about wholeheartedly supporting 
his leadership role in the opposition movement. While PAS is prepared to accept Anwar’s 
current role as the leader of the opposition, major figures in the party have raised doubts 
about his seemingly unbridled ambition. Second, the long-term future of the Peoples’ 
Alliance remains murky to many within the PAS leadership, particularly given the DAP’s 
staunch opposition to their Islamic state objective. Indeed, the conservative elements of the 
PAS leadership see the DAP as a major hurdle to the party’s ultimate goal of establishing 
an Islamic state in Malaysia. As a consequence, while the party remains committed to 
the opposition alliance it is not under any delusions regarding its limitations. Third, there 
remains a pool of PAS leaders who share UMNO’s concern regarding the increasing 
assertiveness of the non-Malays, and the threat that this would pose to Malay-Muslim 
primacy. This uncertainty is compounded by the fact that PAS has been relegated from 
its previous position as the second most powerful party in Malaysia in 1999 (by virtue 
of the number of parliamentary seats it controlled) to the fourth in the pecking order, 
behind PKR and DAP. 
In sum, contrary to the aspirations to transcend race-based politics articulated by the 
opposition during the election, the communal framework still holds sway, while ethnic, 
racial, and religious referents remain factored into the calculations of the members of the 
Peoples’ Alliance; fundamental ideological cleavages persist, and the narrative of Malay 
supremacy continues to weigh down the prospects for democratic pluralism in Malaysia. ■ 
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